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1. Abstract
In this project, we aimed to design and implement a network protocol, using existing C
networking libraries as a foundational basis for expansion and elaboration. Our design,
Lightweight Speed Protocol (LSP), aims to offer increased flexibility and adaptability for
programmers utilizing our protocol compared to existing alternatives (such as TCP). LSP aims to
offer these benefits by utilizing variable levels of encryption (specifiable by the programmer
using our protocol) and customizable amounts of cache space to store these varying levels of
encryption algorithms. In order to give developers as much flexibility as possible, we want to
pass on to them the ability to choose based on their circumstances to what extent they would like
to trade speed for security, size, and reliability. After all, why would we assume the balance
developers want to make for them? The optimal balance of speed and any given design
parameter depends on what the developer utilizing the protocol wants to accomplish with it, so
LSP aims to offer that flexibility to developers by intuitively integrating that functionality into
the protocol such that developers can quickly decide for themselves how best to balance speed
and either security, size, or reliability (or some combination of the three) as they desire, without
significantly increasing their development times.

2. Background
The internet was created to connect the world, but it wasn’t created to do so securely. As such, it
is now the job of cybersecurity professionals, network designers, and IT administrators alike to
make sure the world’s communications are secure and authentic. In general, the deeper engrained
these protections are in our networks, the more secure the transmissions will be; if it were
impossible to intercept the physical electric pulses (beit carried in a wire or transmitted through
the air) that carry information to and from host devices, there would be no need to encrypt data
as it passes through the internet. One theoretical way to accomplish this would be to create a
dedicated hardline connection between every device connected to the internet that would be
guarded 24/7 to prevent physical interceptions of the signals as they travel along the wires;
however, with a predicted 50 billion devices connected to the internet at the end of 2020], using
this method to secure the internet would take approximately two sextillion five hundred
quintillion wires (and presumably as many humans to guard the wires), not a feasible solution
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(Davis). Therefore, given our current understanding of the internet, it will be necessary to look
higher up the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model in order to safeguard network traffic. It
is worth noting that the OSI Layer Model and the TCP/IP Model both describe the layers at
which different programs run the internet (Tetz).

3. Proposed Solution
The most important part of any solution is its adaptability and usability, after all, if nobody wants
to use it then why should it exist? With this in mind, our protocol aims to replicate the reliability
and integrity of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) while also introducing additional
security features not present in TCP (or at least not present in the early iterations of TCP). We are
not suggesting that our protocol will be entirely secure against all types of attacks, as that would
be impossible to guarantee, but we do aim to create a more secure protocol based on the
fundamental principles of TCP in order to increase the overall security of the internet.
We further believe that in order to create the most widely adaptable protocol possible, it is
important to offer the end users flexibility in how the security features are implemented, both in
terms of memory/disk space used and in terms of time used to run these security features in real
time. The former is important because not all devices have vast amounts of physical storage to
utilize, especially for something as fundamental as connecting to the internet (something that
often isn’t considered a feature but rather a necessity for modern devices). The latter is equally
important because in order to be cost effective, many smart devices today have very limited
computing/processing power. Thus, it is important to allow the programmers utilizing a specific
protocol to customize the computational strength and storage allocation of the network protocols
they are using, as it allows them to tailor the technical specifications/metrics of the protocol to fit
their specific use case (for instance, utilizing an encryption algorithm that runs the fastest on
their given chipset and utilizes only a certain number of kilo-or-mega-bytes to cache
previously/frequently made connections). This design strategy will allow the protocol to be
lightweight and robust in situations where processing power and disk space are limited without
restricting the protocol to the point where it is unsuitable for heavier-demand situations. We
believe such a solution can be created by taking the existing framework TCP/IP provides and
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modifying the Transport Control Protocol to offer increased user customization, as detailed in
later sections of this paper.

4. Existing Technologies
Currently, it is common for application developers to create bespoke
transport-and-application-layer protocols that fulfill the requirements of their given project. This
way of approaching computer networking has led to a wide proliferation of protocols adapted for
a broad range of purposes. Doing so may lead to minor improvements in aspects such as network
traffic efficiency or connection initialization times, but creating these custom protocols for each
and every application also drastically increases the development time of software; it would be
much more time-efficient for developers to be able to utilize a boilerplate, widely-adaptable
protocol that leaves room for improvements without pigeonholing users into using an overly
rigid protocol.
Underlying nearly all existing transport layer/application layer protocols are two of the
most fundamental protocols: User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and Transport Control Protocol
(TCP). UDP offers low-latency but unreliable connections, while TCP offers reliable, in-order
data transfer but is slower and has a longer initialization time. Over the past several decades in
software engineering, there has been a trend towards creating workaround-protocols that offer
similar reliability to that offered by TCP while building off of UDP’s foundational principles.
Perhaps the most prominent example of this is Google’s Quick UDP Internet Connections
(QUIC) protocol, which aims to offer lower latency when delivering web content; such an
implementation, however, has been deemed slower than TCP when delivering large amounts of
data, bringing us back once again to the idea that offering the end-user flexibility in the behavior
of the protocol they use may be a better way forward for networking (Costa).
A similar solution to the one we have proposed is the use of TCP in conjunction with
Transport Layer Security (TLS), a cryptography protocol that was created to address some of the
inherent security concerns with TCP (which, again, are derived from the fact that the internet
was created to connect the world, not to do so securely). TLS is not without its own flaws,
however, as some of the earliest versions became deprecated in March 2020 due to security
concerns (Ars). Specifically, TLS 1.0 and 1.1 were vulnerable to man in the middle attacks,
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which are a security vulnerability our team is grappling with in our own project as well (a more
in depth discussion of man in the middle attacks will be provided in subsequent sections).

5. Aspects of the Project
Traditionally, a basic network protocol consists of the following parts: a way to accept messages
to send, a way to send those messages, a way to listen for and receive messages from other
senders, and a way to communicate those received messages back to the requestor. All of this can
be done within a single program without requiring any additional disk space or helper programs.
The structure of a network protocol becomes more complex when introducing encryption, and
we further aim to substantiate the protocol by utilizing on-disk caching to allow for quicker
connection establishment times when one or more of the hosts communicating has the
security-information of the other host cached. These aspects do inherently add weight to the
protocol, which could be seen as at odds with the core principle of being lightweight and robust
mentioned in §A proposed solution, but we believe that these features will actually foster
lightweightness and robustness rather than inhibit it.

6. Design Report Deliverable, updated for Thesis
The following section details the design report deliverable we produced as part of the Winter
requirements for this project. It is worth noting that parts of the design report have been omitted
and parts have been expanded upon in order to best integrate the design report into this thesis.

6.1. Issue at Hand
Currently, a security problem exists every time an IOT device (or nearly any other device for that
matter) connects to the internet; this problem is a problem of data privacy, as network traffic is
not encrypted by default. Instead, hosts are typically required to provide any form of encryption
themselves, adding computational overhead and additional programming requirements to the
development of any software/product with a network component.
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6.2. Motivation
Instead of assuming the balance of computational resources spent on encryption/decryption of
internet traffic, what if the encryption-complexity was easily customizable by the programmer
utilizing the protocol? Such a utility would allow programmers to quickly implement bespoke
encryption solutions into their applications without having to create their own functionalities
from scratch, thereby reducing their development times. Further, such a technology would reduce
the computational cost associated with encryption and decryption by allowing programmers to
utilize an encryption standard that they deem secure enough for their project without
unnecessarily encrypting to “overkill” levels of security. This might not have a huge impact on
enterprise-grade servers, but it could have a huge impact on the speed and relative power of IOT
devices, many of which are barebones and very weak in terms of computational power.
The problem of securing the internet is not a new one, as it has been a problem roughly
since the inception of the internet, but this versatile and adaptable solution is a new, hopefully
better implementation of encryption/decryption as a means of securing network traffic.

6.3. Business, Products, and Problem Statement
From a business perspective, this intended solution is significant because not only does it secure
network traffic, thereby preventing malicious actors for intercepting and/or interfering with
transmissions, but it also reduces the computing power processors need in order to provide fast
and reliable encryption/decryption of these secure network transmissions, thereby increasing the
availability and feasibility of secure network traffic for low power devices. Such a solution offers
multiple benefits for businesses/development teams: shorter development times (and cheaper as a
result of being shorter) by utilizing our protocol that can be quickly and easily adapted to meet
their specific needs and increased customer confidence in the security of the software they’re
using because of the use of our security-focused encrypted protocol.

6.3.1. Problem Statement Questions
● Do the stakeholders (student(s), advisor, customers or users if any) agree on the purpose
and scope of the project?
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Yes, both student and advisor agreed on the purpose and scope of the project; more specifically,
the purpose of the project is to create an implementation of a network protocol that can be used
with little or no overhead by IOT devices (not limited to IOT devices but the protocol will be
made with IOT devices in mind), in order to offer them much faster encryption/decryption times
than would normally be possible via their built-in processing power (all without distracting the
IOT device’s CPU from the task it was originally developed to accomplish). In addition to this
protocol, the student intends to talk about in later design documents how this prototype project
could be further improved upon using computer engineering principles.
● Is there sufficient technical content in the project?
Yes, there is sufficient technical content in the project. In developing a network protocol, there
are numerous technical design considerations and technical implementation requirements and
hurdles that must be overcome; thus, the nature of this project is highly technical.
● Do the stakeholders have a vision of what the project solution or product will look like?
Can they describe how someone would use the product?
Yes, the stakeholders do have a vision of what the end product will look like; briefly
summarized, the end product will be a network protocol that IOT-device programmers can use to
offload the task of encryption/decryption and network traffic to a flexible, customizable protocol,
simplifying their job as a programmer and freeing additional resources on the IOT-device itself.
Thus, use of the product will, from the user’s perspective, look identical to current uses of
network protocols (simply calling the protocol’s library and utilizing a family of functions to
send and receive data).
● Do the stakeholders agree on the criteria defining a successful project?
Yes, a successful project is one in which a network protocol is delivered which achieves the
goals outlined above regarding encryption/decryption, speed, and flexibility.

6.3.2. Brooks’ Programming Products Questions
● Is the product deployable on a variety of platforms, in addition to the one on which it was
developed?
10

○ Original Intent:
We intend to make the product deployable on any platform which supports the programming
language ultimately used for implementation of the protocol (which will likely be C, meaning
near-universal support).
○ Updated Response:
The product is fully deployable and extendable on universal, unix supporting platforms, though
we would like to further enhance the reliability-testing of cross platform support in the future.
Within the encryption translation unit, we would like to add support for unit tests to ensure that
the executable code being sent back and forth between hosts runs to generate the same outputs
for a given set of inputs.
● Is the product thoroughly tested, on a variety of platforms?
○ Original Response:
As of right now, we intend to test on Windows 10, Ubuntu Linux, MacOS, and Raspberry Pi OS,
meaning that yes, we do intend to thoroughly test the product on a variety of platforms.
○ Updated Response:
The product was most extensively tested on MacOS using an Intel processor, but it was also
tested to ensure baseline functionality/operability on Ubuntu Linux machines. The source code
for the project was compiled using gcc and written using generic C libraries, so we are very
confident that the project will work on other platforms as well.
● Does the project documentation include a set of test cases exploring the boundaries of
functionality that users and programmers can use to verify an installation or modification
of the product?
○ Original Response:
We will try to include this in our ultimate deliverable documentation; off the top of my head, we
cannot think of many edge cases for network protocols, but we will research this further and
consult with our advisor when we reach this stage of development.
○ Updated Response:
The project’s documentation does include standard template files that allow users and
programmers to expand upon the basic functionality of the protocol if they desire to.
11

Additionally, a “hello, world!” example program is included in the project’s source files so that
users and programmers utilizing the protocol can easily learn about how the protocol is intended
to be used and how running the protocol works.
● Is the project documentation complete enough that a competent third party could install,
use, maintain, and extend the product?
○ Original Response:
We intend for the project documentation to be complete enough to achieve this end, yes.
○ Updated Response:
We are happy to say that we believe we met this goal. All components of the project are
compartmentalized. The sending/receiving unit, the cache management unit, and the encryption
translation unit are all separated into distinct source files, where their individual functionalities
are broken down into individual functions. Along with the documentation, a competent third
party should have no problem installing, using, maintaining, and extending the protocol.
● Are these documented sufficiently so that an independent third party reader could
evaluate the success of the final result?
○ Original Response:
We also intend to achieve this end in our project, yes.
○ Updated Response:
Yes, we believe that an independent third party reader could evaluate the success of the final
result, although our successes do come with somewhat of a caveat for reasons we will cover in
the results section of the thesis below.

6.4. User Scenarios
As a network protocol, the primary user scenario is that a user will be using our protocol
to send/receive network traffic to/from another machine. When deployed in software projects,
the end user of our protocol will likely be completely unaware of its unique existence, as the user
experience will be identical to that of any other network protocol (in the sense that the
complexities of the protocol are abstracted away from the end user). That being said, the protocol
is being created with developers in mind (perhaps not as an end user, but certainly as a customer
12

of this project). Our aim is to enhance the development process for other software engineers by
offering them a simple, lightweight, and robust/adaptable network protocol that offers built-in
security features for them to customize and use in ways that best fit their specific needs. Beyond
that, there is no other user scenario; network protocols are a technology that don’t do much on
their own; rather, they serve as complements for all the amazing things that can be done using a
network protocol (and using the internet as a whole).

6.5. Evaluation Criteria
Our protocol has been evaluated (in the results section) based on the following functional
criteria: average reliability of transfer between two hosts and average transfer speed between two
hosts. We intend to compare both of these metrics to the performance of a similar protocol (TCP)
under the same network conditions. Also, in order to ensure the accuracy of these measurements,
we will perform numerous tests for both our protocol and TCP in order to ensure a fair
comparison is made. We also intend to look at the non-functional criteria of security, looking at
how well our protocol secures data being sent as well as considering which potential attack
methods may be able to compromise the security of our data.

6.6. Development timeline (omitted because project is now complete)
6.7. Project Risks
We identified the following risks for our protocol:
● Failure for our protocol to be comparable or faster than TCP
● Failure for our protocol to be secure against our theorized threat-attack-model
● Failure related to overall development time and potential time crunch (this being a one
person project)
● Failures associated with version control and repository management mishaps
● Failure related to the pandemic
And, looking back now on these risks, we are content to say that although we didn’t entirely
avoid all of our risks, our failures were centered around the performance of the protocol itself
rather than around the quantity of effort put into the protocol. Our protocol did end up being
significantly slower than expected, but the reliability of the protocol was relatively high and the
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security is as flexible as we intended to make it, even though there is still room for improvement
in all aspects of the protocol (just as there is likely still room for improvement in most pieces of
software).

6.8. Use Cases
Below is our use case diagram:

Figure 1: The use cases and functionalities we implemented in our protocol.

End Developer Use Cases:
We expect the developer to set up the protocol by configuring parameters such that the
protocol runs optimally on their machine and optimally for their purposes. Accordingly, the
developer is expected to alter settings including which encryption/decryption algorithm is used to
communicate with other machines as well as which caching algorithm (eg. least recently used,
first in first out, etc) is used to store metadata about other hosts an instance of the protocol has
previously connected to. Lastly, the developer can specify the maximum amount of space on disk
that should be allocated to this cached metadata.
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Host Machine Use Cases:
The host machine’s use cases operate in tandem with the destination machine’s use cases.
Both run the same protocol that includes caching metadata about other hosts, encrypting and
decrypting messages being sent and received, creating and destroying the underlying TCP-like
socket connections (built atop C’s socket.h library) that provide the foundational framework for
the rest of the protocol to build off of, and running reliability checks to ensure that data is being
transmitted correctly.

6.9. Conceptual Model

Figure 2: Conceptual Model for LSP, a component-based approach.

Our conceptual model for the protocol is based on the notion of compartmentalization. This will
allow us to more easily build and test individual units, and it will also allow future programmers
utilizing (or updating) our protocol to more easily adapt the protocol’s functionality to meet their
specific needs, should they feel the need to update or replace any existing part of the protocol
(for instance, upgrading the caching system to rely on a database rather than on a traditional file
on disk). As such, the conceptual model shown above is broken down such that each unique
aspect of the protocol (namely the transmission unit, the cache unit, and the encryption unit), are
each written and maintained separately from one another. For our implementation, this meant
housing each of the components in a unique C file, and then tying them all together in a primary
testing program that served as our testbench for the protocol.
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6.10. List of Requirements (Functional and Non-Functional)
We have the following functional requirements:
● Transfer Speeds within +-10% (or faster) of TCP in our testing
● Reliability (dropped packets) within +-10% (or better) of TCP in our testing
And the following non-functional requirements:
● Ease of use/implementation on the developer’s end
● Secure transmission which is safe against our attack methods
After implementation and testing, we were able to meet three out of the four requirements. We
were left unable to achieve transfer speeds within +-10% of TCP, though this shouldn’t be
surprising given the worldwide, multi-decade effort that has been put into making TCP what it is
today. Furthermore, even though we were only able to dedicate a limited number of iterations to
our project (and even though this project was completed by a team of one), we are still happy
with the results of the project, having achieved high a high reliability in our tests, having created
a protocol which we believe is easy to use and implement by developers utilizing the protocol,
and that places security at the forefront of its design (even if it isn’t perfectly defended against all
attacks, which we don’t believe it is). We aren’t surprised by the relative security of our protocol,
and if anything we believe that we have done a much more thorough job integrating and
prioritizing security than early versions of TCP did, since they offered little-to-no security
features.
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6.11. System Sequence Diagram/Flow Chart

Figure 3: Sequence Diagram for the Handshaking Process.

This sequence diagram details the four potential cases that could arise when two hosts are
connecting. In case one, both hosts know each other and the two hosts can immediately begin
sending and receiving encrypted messages, since both hosts already have a copy of the
encryption algorithm executable that will be used to secure communication between the two. In
case two, host A recognizes host B (by having metadata about host B in its cache, as well as by
having an encryption executable stored on disk to communicate); however, host B does not
recognize host A. Therefore, before the two can begin communicating using the preferred
encryption algorithm, host A must send a copy of the encryption executable to host B using
17

public/private key encryption (used as a standard across the protocol to manage interoperability
among hosts that have not previously communicated with each other). Once host A sends this
executable file to host B using a separate thread, and after host B confirms that the executable
file works properly on its own processor by utilizing the reliability checks mentioned in §6.8 Use
Cases, then the two hosts can begin sending encrypted data back and forth between each other
based on the read/write calls written by the programmer utilizing the protocol. Case four is
identical to case two except that in case four, host B is the one who recognizes host A, meaning
that host B is the one that will send the previously agreed upon encryption executable to host A
before the two hosts begin communicating in the manner the programmer utilizing the protocol
intends them to. Case three is similar to cases two and four, except that this time, neither host has
any recollection of having communicated with the other in the past (either because they have
never communicated before or because both hosts have wiped metadata of the other from their
caches). In this case, the initiating host (host A) will generate a new encryption executable to be
used (or rely upon an existing one, depending on what the programmer utilizing the protocol
specifies) and send that new executable to host B to be used as the pair’s means of encryption
and decryption.
These additional steps that must take place during the handshaking process do
doubtlessly increase the connection time of our protocol compared to other protocols such as
TCP that do not undergo such rigorous handshaking, but our hope is that most of the time, no file
transfers will be necessary during the handshaking process, as we hope that the majority of the
time, the caches being used will be large enough to ensure that both hosts remember the other,
thereby decreasing the average time necessary to establish a connection between two hosts.
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6.12. Architectural Diagram
Below is our architectural diagram, which lays out how we envision our protocol will interact
with the rest of the system:

Figure 4: The System Architecture Hierarchy of our protocol in use. Note: we are only responsible for developing
the green portions.

We intend for our protocol to be integrated into larger projects in a manner similar to that of any
other C library (for our current, C based implementation, though it would be possible to
implement the theoretical principles of our protocol in other languages as well). This diagram
represents the compartmentalization of our protocol into distinct functional units such that
individual units can be updated or replaced individually without impacting the rest of the
protocol (for example, the caching unit could individually be replaced, upgrading from the
existing file-on-disk storage solution to a database storage solution, without affecting the
functionality or implementation of the rest of the protocol).
19

6.13. Design Rationale
Our design rationale is centered around three primary components: the networking interface
itself, the encryption interface for users of the protocol to interact with, and the specific means of
caching of host-host encryption methods on disk. With all of these, we approached our solution
with the intention of creating as flexible and adaptable a solution as possible. In other words, we
aimed to make each of our design choices such that we could create as widely versatile a
protocol as possible.
More specifically, for the networking interface, we have chosen to implement a modified
version of TCP (Transmission Control Protocol). This is important because the in-order, reliable
data transfer afforded by TCP allows our protocol to support the widest variety of encryption
protocols possible, and means an end-user does not need to test to see if the specific encryption
algorithm they select to use works without these fundamental aspects of TCP. If UDP (User
Datagram Protocol) were to be used instead, for instance, then some encryption algorithms that
rely upon in-order encryption/decryption (as an example) would fail to operate correctly since
UDP cannot guarantee that all packets will arrive, nor can it guarantee the order in which packets
do arrive.
Regarding our second point, we intend for users to be able to specify the intended
encryption algorithm to be used by a given host at set-up/development time, after which they will
no longer have to reconfigure or re-assign any aspects of the protocol.
Thirdly, and similar to the second point, we intend to allow users to specify which caching
algorithm they intend to use to store host-host encryption algorithm pairs (eg. first-in-first-out,
least-recently-used, etc.) as well as allowing users to specify the overall disk space capacity they
intend to allocate to this caching process. This will allow end-users to optimize the caching
performed by the protocol in a way most ideal for their specific use case.

6.14. Technologies Used
Our implementation of the protocol was written in the C programming language. We selected C
based on its speed and performance. Theoretically, it may be more advantageous to choose an
even lower level language than C to take full advantage of the underlying hardware as a means
20

of maximizing performance; however, C was the lowest level language that we were familiar
with, which is how it ended up being selected as our language.
Within the C programming language, we used the socket.h library in order to implement
our networking features, as well as stdio.h and stdlib.h in order to perform file input/output for
caching and encryption/decryption method storage.

6.15. Component State Chart
Below is a component state chart showing the different states our protocol can be in:

Figure 5: Set of states the protocol could be in at any given time..

While in an idle state (not actively running), the programmer utilizing our protocol can set design
parameters including the encryption algorithm used to communicate with other hosts as well as
some cache storage settings such as what caching algorithm to use and how large of a cache to
use. Once the protocol is running, there are three primary states the protocol operates in (each of
which have many more sun states than would be productive to include in this diagram). The first
non-idle state entered is when the protocol is initializing a connection to another host. This is the
handshaking process detailed in Section 11, system sequence diagram/flow chart, wherein a pair
of hosts decide the terms under which they will communicate for the remainder of their
interaction. Once this state is complete, the protocol enters a state wherein a connection has been
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established with another instance of the protocol, and the two are now able to send and receive
data according to the intentions of the programmers who wrote the two communicating hosts.
Once all of these communications are complete, the two hosts close their respective connections,
disconnect from one another, and enter the connection closed state. From a programming and
utilization perspective, the connection closed state is essentially the same as the idle state, as new
connections can then be opened once closing this original connection (or multiple different
connections could be opened in parallel, though doing so would require multiple threads of the
protocol to be running).

6.16. Test Plan and Test Cases
Our test plan was to first ensure functionality of the protocol in terms of ability to successfully
transmit packets across a network, ability to cache and decache encryption methods, and ability
for the user to customize some of the functional parameters we’ve described above. Once this
functional testing was complete, we shifted towards metric-based testing.
In metric based testing, we will compare the speed and reliability of our protocol to that
of TCP under similar network conditions (as similar as we can create). We intend to run these
tests of speed and reliability a number of times in order to ensure accuracy and reliability of our
comparisons. Below are some specific test cases we executed.
Functional Tests:
● Protocol can successfully transmit data between hosts without loss
● Protocol can store/retrieve cached data about host-host connections
● Protocol can accept user-specified parameters about how it should function
Metrics Tests (in our testing):
● Protocol has Transfer Speeds within +-10% (or faster) of TCP (burst & large transfers)
● Protocol has Reliability (dropped packets) within +-10% (or better) of TCP
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6.17. User Manual
Below are the function signatures as well as a description of what each function in our protocol
achieves, serving as our user manual (along with a provided hello world example in our actual
code base:
int openConnection(char address[], int port) // Used to open a protocol
connection between self and another host running the protocol at the specified address and port.
Handles the handshaking process and once this function is finished, the protocol is ready to
read/write data using protocolRead and protocolWrite.
int protocolWrite(struct CacheEntry destination, char* message,
int do_translation) // Write the passed data (as a char* array) to the specified host.
Parameter do_translation is used to specify whether or not the message should be encrypted
(internally, the protocol sends some non-encrypted traffic during the handshaking process, but
for end-programmers the do_translation parameter should always be set to true, i.e. non-zero).
Returns one if data was successfully sent, zero otherwise.
char* protocolRead(struct CacheEntry source, size_t
message_length, char* listening_port, int do_translation) // Read
the given amount of data (message_length) sent by the host specified by the given CacheEntry.
Local instance of the protocol listens on the specified listening port.
int fileTransfer(struct CacheEntry source, char* direction,
char* file_name, char* port_in) // Internal function used by the protocol during
the handshaking process in openConnection, used to exchange encryption algorithm executables
between communicating instances of the protocol (though an end user would never need to use
this function directly).
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char* searchCache(char address[], char port[]) // Search through the
cache structure (in our implementation, through the file on disk that serves as the store of
information). Returns a string of the cache information, if found, and null otherwise.
struct CacheEntry extractCache(char cache_string[]) // Helper function
that turns the string returned by the searchCache function into a CacheEntry structure so that it
can more readily be used elsewhere in the protocol.
void updateCache(struct CacheEntry cache) // Update the existing
information for a given host (primary keyed by IP and port number) with the new metadata for
that host, if it exists in the cache, otherwise do nothing.
void deleteFromCache(struct CacheEntry cache) // Delete the existing
information for a given host (primary keyed by IP and port number) if it exists in the cache,
otherwise do nothing.
void writeToCache(struct CacheEntry cache) // Write a new CacheEntry
structure to the cache file, thereby adding a new host to the cache.
char* translateMessage(char* direction, char* input) // Parameter
direction is either “encode” or “decode” and input is the data to be encoded or decoded by the
relevant encryption algorithm.
A further understanding of the protocol can be achieved by taking a look at our commented hello
world program that is provided with the protocol’s code base (see appendix for full source code).
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6.18. Test and Experimental Results

Figure 6: CPU Time of the protocol in our performance testing.

Depicted in this diagram is the percentages of runtime spent in user space memory, system space
memory, and idle space (spent executing other programs) while running LSP during our
testbench metrics tests. A more detailed analysis of these numbers is given at the bottom of this
section, below both figures.
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Figure 7: Transfer Speed over time and Reliability over time of LSP in our benchmark tests.

It is worth noting that these measurements were taken from two instances of the protocol running
on a local machine, meaning that in theory a twofold increase in performance may be possible if
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the protocol were to be run on two separate machines; however, even this twofold improvement
in performance would not fix some critical flaws in the implementation of the protocol that we'll
explain further in the next section. None of this is to say that the protocol was not a success or
that it is bad, but rather this project has made clear the importance of undergoing many iterations
of development, especially for code that aims to be as fast as possible, rather than just the
handful of iterations we was able to undergo ourselves in this project. Regarding the metrics
themselves, the graph on the left details percentages of time the protocol spent in user space,
system space, and idle space (when other programs on the machine were running). On average,
the protocol itself was in charge of the CPU approximately 5.9% of the time. Meanwhile, the
operating system (responsible for the I/O calls), was in charge 26.9% of the time. And lastly, the
CPU wasn't running the protocol at all 67.2% of the time. These hurdles resulted in a relatively
low average transfer speed of 4.45 megabits per second, meaning that in its current infancy LSP
is unlikely to replace any of the major networking protocols anytime soon. However, despite
these struggles with speed, LSP was able to achieve an average reliability (measured as
percentage packets sent without error) of just over 87%, which is a strong initial accuracy.

7. Shortcomings
As we neared the end of our implementation, we began to notice a few theoretical shortcomings
in the implementation of LSP. They weren't issues with the design or conceptualization, they
were just issues and slowdowns that resulted from my lack of deep knowledge about how to
program a network protocol from scratch. The first shortcoming we noticed came from the
compartmentalization of encryption algorithms into separate executable files. At our level of
programming knowledge, this was necessary in order to pass executable code between hosts, as
we otherwise did not/still do not know of a way to send code from one host to another and then
have the recipient host run that code within the same instance of the running protocol. However,
if such a feat is possible, then it would eliminate the need for the protocol to perform several
context switches (from protocol to encryption translation unit then back to protocol, and possibly
to other running processes as well if the operating system decides to switch to those running
processes). We theorize that this is the reason the idle time of the protocol is so high; since it so
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frequently passes control back to the operating system, which may or may not keep running the
protocol.
Secondly, we noticed the potential for slowdowns resulting from the fact that every time
a message is encoded or decoded, the result is stored in a temporary buffer on disk. This likely
severely limits the potential performance of the protocol since every time a message is sent or
received, it must first be written to and read from disk at least once before it is even usable. Once
again, we weren't sure exactly how to implement this improvement, but we believe that it would
be possible to significantly improve the performance of the protocol by utilizing pipes rather than
files on disk in order to pass data back and forth between the network interface unit and the
encryption translation unit.
Thirdly, the supposed convenience we offered to programmers by trying to make utilizing
the protocol as easy as possible for programmers by making each protocolRead and
protocolWrite operation into its own socket opening, connection establishment, connection
closing, and socket closing likely reduces the long-run speed of the protocol, since for situations
where two peers are communicating back and forth repeatedly (as was the case in my
performance tests), the programs were repeatedly unnecessarily opening and closing the very
same socket and connection they were using to communicate. This could potentially be improved
upon by allowing a persistent connection to be opened/closed at the discretion of the
programmer, rather than fully abstracting away that aspect of the protocol from the programmer
utilizing it.
Next, the performance of the protocol may have been improved in my performance tests
had we not read the test data from disk in the sending program and had we not written the test
data to disk in the receiving program. This method meant that data was being written to/read
from data at least twice in the process, if the sending and receiving protocols are assumed to be
operating in parallel, and three times if they are not operating in parallel. Having so many read
and write operations occurring in a networking protocol of all things is not ideal, as it means the
protocol, already being slowed down by the IO-bound network traffic, was then also being
slowed down by the IO-bound disk operations.
And lastly, a design consideration that could've sped up and alleviated some of these
problems was deciding what packet sizes of data to send through the protocol. The larger the
packet size, the less each of these factors we mentioned above would impact the performance of
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the protocol, but larger packet sizes also introduce more room for errors in reliability and larger
packet sizes, beyond a reasonable size, also stop being a realistic test of performance as it is
unlikely that any programmer utilizing the protocol would ever use a packet size of say, for
example, one terabyte. For the results and metrics we discussed in §6.18, we settled on a
relatively small packet size of 1000 bytes.

8. Societal Issues
Ethical
In designing this protocol, we felt as though we had an ethical responsibility to try to best
preserve the security and integrity of the data being sent through our protocol. This is especially
important if our protocol were ever to be used in production code, wherein end users would be
relying upon and trusting our protocol to protect their sensitive data, especially since we
identified security as one of the key pillars of this project. One could also raise ethical concerns
over what data is securely being sent back and forth via our protocol, and whether or not that
data could be malicious, though that is unfortunately far beyond our control, and it would
perhaps be worse on our end to monitor and detect malicious traffic being sent through our
protocol, since that could be seen as an invasion of privacy on our part.

Social
Our protocol shouldn’t have any social impacts that are unique from any other networking
protocol; a network protocol on its own has little social value. Instead, it is the projects created
using network protocols that can have vast social impacts.

Political
Similar to the potentially-malicious note we mentioned for ethical concerns, malicious use of our
protocol could be political in nature if the malicious data being sent was being sent
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Economic
There is a potentially high economic cost associated with retroactively integrating our protocol
into existing projects, since that would require those projects to rewrite how their applications
interact at the transport level (even though we tried to make our implementation as similar as
possible to existing implementations, we cannot guarantee complete plug-and-play
compatibility). For these reasons, we primarily see our protocol as being used in new projects
rather than in existing ones.

Health and Safety
As a networking protocol, we see relatively few health and safety concerns associated with our
protocol. Those that do exist primarily deal with the reliability of the protocol, as reliability of
critical information reaching its destination could mean the difference between life and death for
mission-critical health and safety systems.

Manufacturability
Since there is no physical aspect to our protocol, we do not see manufacturability as a concern.

Sustainability
We hope that the compartmentalization of our protocol will mean that it can be adapted for many
interactions to come without having to rewrite the entirety of the code base and without having to
scrap the project altogether. Thus, we feel as though our protocol has the potential to be highly
sustainable.

Environmental Impact
The energy demands associated with network traffic (and especially for things like streaming
services in the modern era); however, we believe that these issues are beyond the scope of our
project, since our protocol does not deal directly with what the data is that is being sent back and
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forth between devices, but instead only deals with sending the data the protocol is told to send
back and forth between devices.

Usability
Through the inclusion of descriptions of each of the functions available to programmers as part
of our protocol, and through the inclusion of a “hello world!” example program, we believe that
our protocol is highly usable.

Lifelong learning
This project definitely helped me prepare to be a lifelong learner, and it inspired me to study new
material and to always be willing to try new, unfamiliar things.

9. Conclusion
Although our protocol won’t be replacing TCP as the prevailing networking protocol in industry
anytime soon, we still feel as though we learned a lot from this experience and are very grateful
to have had this opportunity. Even when things don’t always work out right the first time, there is
always room for introspection, growth, and learning. In building a networking protocol which we
would essentially call from scratch, we learned the importance of making code that is not only
functional, but that is also fast. We don’t believe there are any critical flaws in the design of
Lightweight Speed Protocol, but we do believe there are some flows in the implementation of
LSP (that we’ve touched on in §7).
From these aforementioned flaws, we believe that the biggest spaces for potential
improvements in performance are possible by integrating the encoding and decoding processes
into the same code execution user space as the main program file, by utilizing pipes rather than
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files on disk to transfer data between components (with the exception of cache data that should
be persistently kept somewhere on disk), and by modifying the implementation of protocolRead
and protocolWrite to allow sockets and connections to be persistent across multiple read and
write operations, meaning that the handshaking process does not have to occur every time
(especially since the handshaking process relies upon checking the cache, and searching through
the cache can be slow depending on the size of the cache and whether or not it is already in
memory).
Overall, this was a very successful project and we are very happy with the outcome.
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Appendix
The complete source code for Lightweight Speed Protocol can be found at
https://github.com/zachardy/lsp (for the foreseeable future).
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